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Abstract: States, rebels, and mafias all provide governance beyond their core 
membership; increasingly, so do prison gangs. U.S. gangs leverage control over 
prison life to govern street-level drug markets. Brazil’s Primeiro Comando da 
Capital (PCC) gang goes further, orchestrating paralyzing attacks on urban 
targets, while imposing a social order throughout slums that sharply reduces 
homicides. We analyze hundreds of seized PCC documents detailing its drug 
business and internal disciplinary system. Descriptively, we find: vast, 
consignment-based trafficking operations whose profits fund collective benefits 
for members’ families; elaborate bureaucratic procedures and recordkeeping; and 
overwhelmingly nonviolent punishments for debt-nonpayment and misconduct. 
These features, we argue, reflect a deliberate strategy of creating rational-
bureaucratic legitimacy in criminal governance. The PCC’s collectivist norms, fair 
procedures, and meticulous “criminal criminal records” facilitate community 
stigmatization of infractors, giving mild sanctions punitive heft and inducing 
widespread voluntary compliance without excessive coercion. This has aided the 
PCC’s rapid expansion across Brazil. 
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Legitimacy in Criminal Governance:  
Managing a Drug Empire from Behind Bars  
 
Rebel groups often provide governance as a means of contesting formal state power 
(Arjona, Kasfir, and Mampilly 2015), but criminal groups with narrower aims also 
govern people and spaces. Criminal governance can extend beyond organizations’ core 
members to entire illicit markets and the civilian communities where such markets 
operate. Canonically associated with mafias and protection rackets (e.g. Blok 1974; 
Skaperdas and Syropoulos 1997; Tilly 1985), criminal governance is increasingly being 
provided by drug-trafficking organizations (DTOs), quite often ones based within 
prison. Scholarship on U.S. prison gangs has provided foundational insights (Skarbek 
2011), but generally lacks systematic data on the practices that sustain and constitute 
prison-based criminal governance, especially beyond the prison walls. Moreover, U.S. 
cases do not cover the empirical range of prison-based governance: Brazilian prison 
gangs govern more intensely and extensively, ruling large urban populations and across 
enormous swaths of territory. This article explores the governance practices of São 
Paulo’s Primeiro Comando da Capital (PCC), likely the most powerful prison gang in the 
world and the leading case of prison-based criminal governance. We analyze a trove of 
the PCC’s own financial and disciplinary records, identifying a novel form of criminal 
governance and theorizing its underlying mechanisms.  
Founded within a São Paulo prison in 1993 by a handful of inmates, the PCC has 
grown into Brazil’s foremost threat to state authority. With some 29,000 “baptized” 
members as of 2018 (Paes Manso and Dias 2018, 19), it is among the largest criminal 
organizations in the hemisphere. The PCC now controls over 135 prisons in São Paulo 
state alone, and has established cells in all 27 Brazilian states and at least five 
neighboring countries. It leverages this control to project its power onto the streets, with 
countervailing effects. The PCC has repeatedly orchestrated debilitating terror attacks 
on state and civilian targets. Yet it also banned unauthorized killings throughout the 
informally urbanized peripheries where it wields influence, contributing to a drastic and 
sustained reduction in statewide homicide rates of about 75 percent. 
We analyze systematic data on the PCC’s street-level drug business and internal 
disciplinary system, making empirical and theoretical contributions. Empirically, we 
find that drug retailing is consignment-based, punishments are mild and meticulously 
recorded, default rates are low, and the resulting profits fund welfare for member 
families. These features, we hypothesize, flow jointly from the PCC’s overarching 
approach to governance: not just imposing its rule, but establishing a form of legitimacy 
along Weberian, rational-bureaucratic lines. This approach induces voluntary 
compliance among members while minimizing internal violence, keeping a 
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decentralized, credit-based drug business profitable in spite of endemic agency 
problems, and in the face of intense militarized policing.  
The descriptive findings in this trove are varied. For example, the same organization 
that loans guns and rent money to recently-released members getting a fresh start also 
spent USD$500 on children’s Easter eggs. We highlight four sets of substantively and 
theoretically puzzling findings. First, the PCC’s trafficking operations in upstate São 
Paulo—the region covered by our data—run on a consignment basis. This contrasts with 
the hierarchical franchise structure and territorial control employed by Rio de Janeiro’s 
Comando Vermelho—an older prison-gang-cum-drug-cartel that the PCC initially 
emulated—and the Chicago gang analyzed by Levitt and Venkatesh (2000). In the five 
months that we observe, the PCC consigned 550kg of crack and 90kg of powder cocaine 
to a decentralized, competitive network of some 500 individual dealers across 89 
municipalities, extending about USD 3.2 million in microcredit.2 The non-payment rate, 
we estimate, was lower than the 30.7 percent markup the PCC charges dealers.  
Second, the resulting profits are not paid out to an “owner” or “shareholders” but 
rather used to provide collective goods. After paying off bulk drug purchases, revenues 
primarily financed an elaborate transportation network for members’ families to far-
flung prisons on visitation days and other member welfare benefits, such as funeral 
costs.  
Third, the PCC possesses a complex system of internal discipline characterized by 
clear rules, collectivist norms, and administrative procedures to ensure transparency 
and fairness. Critically, unpaid debts were punished exclusively with nonviolent 
sanctions like suspension or expulsion from the organization, and physical punishment 
was exceedingly rare. 
Fourth, the documents reveal a thoroughgoing embrace of bureaucracy: codified 
structures and procedures, reflected in meticulous recordkeeping. While attention to 
detail is unsurprising in financial documents, even greater care goes into maintaining 
the individual personnel files we dub “criminal criminal records”, which track members’ 
background and history of interactions with the organization, including previous 
infractions. The PCC, our trove reveals, is a prodigious producer and keeper of data. 
We advance a theory of legitimate criminal governance to explain these findings. 
The PCC’s consignment model is subject to agency problems: it requires regular 
repayment by far-flung dealers with incentives to default. The procedurally fair and 
meticulously documented system of “criminal criminal justice” solves this problem, 
                                                           
2 Our financial data spans September 2011 – April 2012; for convenience, we use the 
January 1, 2012 exchange rate (1.867 BRL/USD) throughout. The rate has depreciated 
significantly since. 
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inducing widespread voluntary compliance through several complementary 
mechanisms. At the level of individual rationality, the PCC’s procedures yield accurate 
records and common knowledge of dealers’ past performance and infractions, so that 
even a mild punishment like a short suspension (by far the most common punishment 
observed) carries a powerful stigma, incentivizing timely debt repayment. At a more 
systemic level, the relative mildness of the PCC’s enforcement regime, its attention to 
fairness in business dealings (including negotiated solutions for debtors in dire straits), 
and its prioritization of public-goods and welfare provision all flow from a 
depersonalized bureaucracy oriented around a body of collectivist norms, rules, and 
practices. The result is a criminal form of legitimate, rational-bureaucratic authority 
(Weber 1968) characterized by submission and loyalty not to individual charismatic 
leaders but to a fair, efficacious, and universal “law”. 
How do mild punishments like suspension from the organization induce individual 
compliance? Ultimately, by providing information to other criminals. As Gambetta 
(2009) observes, for criminals to work together, they need to identify and reliably assess 
one another without revealing themselves to authorities. Gambetta focuses on symbolic 
codes as signals, but suggests that incarceration, ironically, can solve this adverse-
selection problem since “just being a prisoner is a clear and simple sign that one is 
criminally inclined” (2009, 11). Moreover, the fairer the official criminal justice system, 
i.e. the more accurately it distinguishes the guilty from the innocent, the more reliable 
the signal that incarceration sends.  
An inverse logic applies to prison gangs’ internal disciplinary systems. A member in 
good standing, besides having been convicted by the state, carries the gang’s seal of 
approval; an expelled or punished member has been found wanting. What others can 
infer from gang punishment depends on that gang’s rules, norms, and disciplinary 
practices. If sanctions are meted out arbitrarily, they convey little information about 
punished members’ actual performance or “type”. Conversely, the fairer the “criminal 
criminal justice” system, the clearer the signal that punishment sends. A mild, non-
violent punishment, if fairly meted out and meticulously recorded, can carry a 
burdensome stigma.  
The PCC’s elaborate, standardized procedures must be understood in this light. Its 
system of graded punishments for dealers with overdue consignment debts—including 
an escalating “three strikes” rule—is tempered by flexibility and patience when dealers 
face unpredictable setbacks (like arrest) or make good faith efforts to repay. For more 
serious infractions, the PCC employs lengthy and potentially risky semi-public trials, 
often adjudicated by imprisoned “elders”, and designed to reduce false convictions and 
excessive punishment (e.g. Feltran 2010). The costs of operating this system, we argue, 
are offset by important dividends: the PCC’s reputation for not being hasty, arbitrary, or 
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unfair increases the stigma of suspension or expulsion, because those convicted cannot 
credibly claim innocence.  
The PCC’s meticulous recordkeeping amplifies this effect; who needs symbolic 
codes when you have detailed records of previous misconduct and punishment, 
including a cell phone number to call for case details? This use of recordkeeping to 
induce good behavior recalls several theorized mechanisms in the literature. Shapiro 
and Siegel (2012) show how the institutional memory that recordkeeping facilitates 
allows terrorist leaders to better motivate operatives who may otherwise slack or skim.3 
Relevant too is Milgrom et al.’s model of the Law Merchant, in which accurate, 
centralized recordkeeping can produce cooperation “without the benefit of state 
enforcement of contracts” (1990, 2). Such conditions prevail in the criminal underworld, 
especially in the far-flung regions covered by our trove, where the PCC’s ability to 
physically punish rulebreakers may be relatively weak.  
However, the PCC also employs elaborate bureaucracy, codified procedures, 
normative appeals, and generally mild punishment in places where its punitive power is 
immense: within prison (Dias and Salla 2013) and São Paulo’s urban periphery (e.g. 
Feltran 2010). Moreover, our data suggest that even when PCC leaders harshen 
discipline to address excessive non-compliance, they avoid draconian measures that 
might maximize short-term profits at the expense of fairness. Thus, we argue, the PCC 
deliberately eschews raw coercive power in order to maintain a form of legitimacy, along 
rational-bureaucratic lines.  
It is an enduring irony that trustworthy, efficient, “Weberian” governance should 
arise among the targets of a state coercive apparatus guided by a brutal and corrupt 
“unrule of law” (Mendez, O’Donnell, and Pinheiro 1999), in a country long hamstrung 
by bureaucratic inefficiency and patrimonialism (Evans 1995). More ironic still, PCC 
governance depends on the state’s own mass-incarceration policies, which swell the 
PCC’s ranks and—by raising the chances of eventual incarceration—give it leverage over 
criminals on the street (Lessing 2017). In São Paulo, these policies inadvertently, 
perversely, helped create a criminal “pocket of efficiency” (Geddes 1990) capable of 
governing a sprawling prison system, a decentralized criminal network, and a vast, 
impoverished urban periphery. While not the first or only Brazilian prison gang to 
establish street-level governance, the PCC’s rational-bureaucratic structure contrasts 
with more charismatic, territorial, and violent approaches, constituting a novel and 
potentially transformative model for organizing crime from behind bars. The PCC’s 
ongoing expansion throughout the prisons and peripheries of Brazil and into 
neighboring countries is chilling evidence of this. 
                                                           
3 Like the PCC, many terrorist organizations prefer suspensions to firing or killing 
operatives, although the authors attribute this to a lack of ready replacements. 
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In the sections below, we: conceptualize criminal governance, provide empirical 
background, describe our data and related ethical and methodological issues, present 
empirical findings, and discuss these findings in light of our theory of the PCC’s 
legitimacy-based approach to governance. We conclude with implications for literatures 
on state-formation and insurgency.  
VARIETIES OF CRIMINAL GOVERNANCE4 
 Criminal governance is more varied than rebel governance in terms of who is 
governed. “Rebel governance” generally refers to rebel–civilian interactions, and 
criminal organizations may also impose rules on and/or provide public goods to non-
criminal “civilian” populations (e.g. Leeds 1996; Ley, Mattiace, and Trejo 2018). 
However, “criminal governance” may also refer to groups’ internal governance (e.g. 
Leeson and Skarbek 2010), or their governance over wider populations of criminal 
actors, often within a specific illicit economy, ethnicity, or territory (e.g. Campana and 
Varese 2018; Skarbek 2011). This capacious understanding of “criminal governance” is 
worth maintaining, since governance mechanisms and institutions often operate across 
these levels (Lessing 2018). 
Criminal governance also varies in terms of what is governed, and where. Both 
criminal and rebel governance tend to occur in places where the state is weak. Yet 
criminal groups rarely pursue rebels’ overarching goal of “competitive state-building” 
(Kalyvas 2006). Rather than challenge state power directly, criminal governance 
flourishes in its interstices. These power vacuums can result from state neglect or 
absence, as in the Sicilian hinterlands where the Mafia arose (Blok 1974), but also 
through state prohibition of economic activities, producing illicit markets (Skaperdas 
and Syropoulos 1997). Criminal governance is often narrow, covering some criminal 
markets and informal economies but not others; when it extends over civilian life, it 
often does so unevenly. A gang might monopolize drug sales, prohibit property crime, 
and punish civilian contact with police, but leave realms like informal transport and 
electoral politics unregulated. Consequently, the boundary between criminal and formal 
state governance is routinely jagged, shifting, and even porous (Arias 2006).  
Another source of variation is the type of organization that governs. Whereas 
traditional mafias, drug cartels and street gangs tend to govern the areas and social 
strata where they are physically based (Campana and Varese 2018; Levitt and Venkatesh 
2000), prison gangs have demonstrated a capacity to govern from a distance. This 
allows them to organize retail drug markets throughout cities and even states, 
something street gangs and mafias have rarely if ever accomplished (e.g. Hagedorn 
1994). The ethnic, racial, and cultural bases of group membership is also important. U.S. 
prison gangs are sharply divided by race and ethnicity, and generally only govern co-
                                                           
4 This section builds on Lessing’s (2018) conceptual framework. 
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ethnic street gangs, limiting their geographic and demographic reach. In Brazil, a myth 
of “racial democracy” both obscures the racialized conditions of urban poverty, violent 
policing, and mass incarceration that foster prison gangs (Alves 2015) and, ironically, 
produces racially integrated gangs capable of city- or state-wide hegemony. 
A critical dimension of variation, we argue, concerns the “how” of criminal 
governance. Conventional wisdom portrays criminal governance as highly coercive, 
personalistic, and arbitrary. Dons, capos, and gang bosses are often charismatic 
authority figures, cultivating fearful reputations, and deploying violence strategically to 
assert dominance and reward loyalty. The PCC, we argue, has developed a style of 
criminal governance closer to Weber’s (1968) notion of rational-bureaucratic legitimacy.   
One of our contributions is to broaden the observed empirical range of these 
dimensions. We analyze a rare body of systematic data on the administrative and 
disciplinary practices that support the PCC’s prison-based governance over a vast street-
level network of sworn members and autonomous affiliates and the retail drug markets 
they operate in. Additional sources suggest that it adopts similar governance practices 
both within prison and over non-criminal civilian populations. That makes PCC 
governance, relative to U.S. cases, more universal, covering diverse populations across 
large urban peripheries; more extensive, covering all of São Paulo state and expanding 
rapidly throughout Brazil; and, we suspect, less violent.  
 
THE PCC 
The PCC is the largest and most sophisticated of Brazil’s facções criminosas, or 
“criminal factions”—gangs born and based in prison that come to control “slum” 
territories and illicit markets beyond prison. The PCC initially modeled itself on the 
Comando Vermelho (CV) faction, which formed in the prisons of Brazil’s military 
dictatorship in the 1970s and dominated Rio de Janeiro’s favelas in the 1980s. The CV 
then fractured, fighting brutally against rivals and police ever since. In contrast, the PCC 
maintains hegemony over São Paulo’s prison system since the 1990s and its urban 
periphery since the 2000s. It also developed into a more complex organization than the 
CV, with distinctive governance practices and a deliberate policy of expansion beyond 
São Paulo to other Brazilian states and even neighboring countries. Since 2000, the rest 
of Brazil has become increasingly “factionalized”, with local “copycat” factions emerging 
in the wake of the PCC’s (and to a lesser extent, the CV’s) arrival.  
Recalling social movements in some ways, Brazil’s factions often frame their 
organizing purpose as a “struggle” (luta) against violence and abuse, particularly by the 
state. This intermingling of normative and criminal goals began with the CV. Its 
founders entered prison as common criminals, but gleaned collectivist techniques from 
Cold-War leftists they were unwisely housed with by the military dictatorship. Whereas 
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the middle-class, predominantly white leftists eventually won amnesty by distinguishing 
themselves from common criminals, one CV founder explains, “Our path could only be 
the opposite: integration with the prison masses and the fight for liberty using our own 
resources” (Lima 1991, 43).5  
The PCC’s founding was also catalyzed by state repression: the 1992 Carandiru 
prison massacre, in which São Paulo Military Police killed 111 mostly defenseless 
prisoners who had rioted to protest guard abuse. A group of survivors, transferred to a 
harsh maximum-security prison under Carandiru’s former warden, formed the PCC in 
1993. Its founding statute states: “We must remain united and organized to avoid a 
similar or worse massacre… a massacre that will never again be forgotten in the 
conscience of Brazilian society… because we, the Comando, will change the way that 
prisons are inhumane, full of injustice, oppression, torture, and massacres.” The statute 
declared an alliance with the CV and adopted its motto “Peace, Justice, and Liberty”. 
The statute has been updated several times, and further distilled into a guiding mission: 
“Peace among thieves and war against the state” (Biondi 2016).  
As the CV did in Rio, the PCC violently eliminated its rivals in São Paulo’s prisons, 
imposing a governance regime that won the allegiance of inmates. It prohibits theft, 
rape, crack cocaine use, and unauthorized violence; provides limited welfare (food, 
medicine, and hygiene products) for the poorest inmates; ensures the supply of drugs, 
cell phones, and other contraband; effectively administers daily prison life; and bargains 
collectively for improvements in prison conditions, especially around family and 
conjugal visits. A disastrous official policy of transferring PCC leaders to other prisons 
(in hopes of neutralizing them) helped them dominate São Paulo’s prison system and 
establish cells throughout Brazil (Figure 1).  
                                                           
5 All translations are the authors’. 
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Figure 1: Geography of PCC Expansion in South America.  
 
A 2002 internal coup led to a “democratizing” reform, symbolized by the addition of 
“Equality” to the “Peace, Liberty, and Justice” motto (Biondi 2016, 60). The new leader, 
alias “Marcola”, replaced the PCC’s personalistic, “pyramidal” structure with a flattened 
hierarchy of institutionalized posts called responsas (“responsibilities”), through which 
members rotate. Marcola deliberately minimized his own leadership role, and extended 
the PCC’s practice of open discussion to every level of decision-making, supported by 
norms against pulling rank (igualdade and humildade). In sworn testimony, one 
deposed PCC founder highlighted the radical nature of Marcola’s reform: “In our time 
there was no such circulating system of authority. We were the founders. We had the 
last word and everyone else… obeyed and did exactly what we ordered. There was 
nothing about consulting two, three, four, or twenty opinions” (in Marques 2010, 325). 
In the wake of the 2002 coup, and as the PCC established hegemony within prison, 
it moved away from brutal executions of rivals and non-compliers, adopting a system of 
gradated, mostly nonviolent punishments (Dias and Salla 2013) similar to the one 
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outside prison we document. It also institutionalized formal tribunals (debates) for 
serious violations in which juries of imprisoned leaders hear testimony from witnesses, 
victims, and even “counsel” (Biondi 2016, King and Valensia 2014), all anchored in a 
rich normative vocabulary emphasizing individual moral uprightness (proceder) and a 
collective “ethos of crime” (Marques 2010).  
From 2000 on, the PCC extended both its criminal activity and governance 
practices from prison to the urban periphery of São Paulo and beyond. Whereas the CV 
took militarized control over Rio’s peripheral communities, granting its semi-
autonomous bosses local monopolies on drug sales (Grillo 2013), the PCC established its 
authority without hard territorial control, regulating criminal activity and supplying 
drugs to a wide network of members and affiliates.  
The PCC claimed a monopoly not on drug retailing but on the legitimate use of 
force, banning killings except those sanctioned by its prison-based tribunals (Feltran 
2018). Ethnographies of low-income neighborhoods in the early 2000s document the 
imposition of this “criminal code of conduct” (lei do crime)—sometimes violently 
resisted by incumbent criminal groups but often peacefully acceded to—and the 
subsequent drop in killings that were “no longer allowed” (e.g. Alves 2015; Feltran 2010; 
Hirata 2010). Biderman et al.’s (2014) difference-in-differences analysis confirms that 
PCC arrival in neighborhoods caused local reductions in homicides, contributing 
significantly to São Paulo’s massive crime drop since 2001 (Figure 2). PCC’s tribunal 
system is now used throughout São Paulo’s periphery, including by non-criminals for 
everyday dispute resolution. It has a high bar for conviction, and deters false accusations 
by sanctioning unsuccessful plaintiffs (Biondi 2016; Feltran 2010). 
 
Figure 2: Timeline of the PCC. 
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In 2006, the PCC used its power on the streets to launch a synchronized wave of 
attacks on São Paulo’s urban transportation, police, and banking infrastructure, while 
instigating simultaneous riots in over 90 prisons. The attacks brought São Paulo to a 
standstill for four days, ending only after officials met face-to-face with Marcola. Since 
2006, São Paulo has seen relative calm, suggesting unspoken accords between 
authorities and the PCC; a brief outbreak of PCC–state conflict in 2012 was likely the 
result of a renegotiation of this tenuous “consensus” (Denyer Willis 2015). Meanwhile, 
the PCC’s early, haphazard spread gave way to a deliberate strategy of expansion to 
every corner of Brazil and even neighboring countries (Figure 1). This colonizing project 
has brought it into conflict with CV-allied local factions, contributing to the 2016 
collapse of the PCC-CV alliance and the subsequent outbreak of street-level turf wars 
and prison massacres throughout Brazil, leaving hundreds dead (Paes Manso and Dias 
2018). 
DATA 
A trove of internal PCC documents, our primary source, was given unsolicited to 
Denyer Willis by a São Paulo state bureaucrat involved in investigations of the PCC, 
during an informal conversation. We describe these data, address ethical and 
methodological concerns, and discuss the additional sources we use to increase 
reliability and provide context. 
The document trove consists of computer files and scans of a handwritten notebook 
seized by police during the 2012 arrests of two PCC members who held the posts of 
bookkeeper (livro) and disciplinarian (disciplina). Almost all the documents relate to 
and were created by the administrative unit known as the “Interior”, covering most of 
São Paulo state outside Greater São Paulo city, and its seven regional subdivisions 
(Regionais). The documents refer overwhelmingly to the period September 2011 - 
October 2012.  
The trove contains over 500 files, including duplicates and dozens of .mp3 music 
files apparently intended to deceive investigators if seized. We focus on a subset of 
unique documents: 
● 23 ledgers (fechamentos, literally “closings”) (19 weekly, 1 bi-weekly, and 3 
monthly). 
● 15 “X-Ray” documents (raio X) detailing individual drug consignments to 
members and affiliates. 
● 5 “bad-debt reports” (relatórios) listing debts thought to be uncollectable 
because of individuals’ expulsion, disappearance, imprisonment, or death.  
● 66 scanned pages from the disciplinarian’s handwritten notebook (henceforth 
“DHN”), mostly detailing individual punishments. 
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● A set of 98 Word files, each recording an individual punishment, seized together 
with DHN (henceforth “DWF”). 
● 10 assorted Word and Excel documents, including intra-organizational 
communiqués (salves). 
 
Such data raise important ethical and methodological concerns. Critical to both, our 
trove is almost certainly part of a larger cache of internal PCC documents amassed by 
the São Paulo Office of the Public Prosecutor (Ministério Público do Estado, MPE) 
during a major investigation that produced over 150 indictments—though few 
convictions—in 2013. We sought, unsuccessfully, to obtain the complete MPE cache. 
However, detailed accounts of these documents and the MPE’s analysis of them appear 
in the State Record of Judicial Proceedings (Diário Oficial de Justícia de São Paulo, 
DJSP); sample documents and summary findings were also published by journalists 
who were given partial access (e.g. Barbieri 2014; Godoy and Paes Manso 2014). These 
sources’ descriptions of the documents’ formatting and structure match those in our 
trove. Moreover, it is unlikely that state officials possessed our trove yet withheld it from 
the MPE. Hence our supposition that the MPE’s cache includes our trove, and our 
confidence that our documents are genuine.  
Our data contain personally identifiable information (PII) about individuals’ 
criminal association and drug trafficking; none of these individuals gave informed 
consent, raising serious ethical concerns. We obtained waivers of consent from our 
respective IRB boards6 based on our anonymization of results; our data security regime; 
and the low risk of additional harm to subjects and families from inadvertent leaks, 
since the data were previously vetted by state prosecutors.  
The data also raise questions of reliability and bias. How do we know these 
documents are genuine, and that that they provide a representative picture of the PCC? 
We follow Mafia scholars’ advice to seek both external validation using “all available 
contextual evidence”—including official files and interviews with key informants—and to 
carry out “internal validity control” by checking consistency across our documents and 
analyzing their metadata (Campana 2016, 5).  
Both external and internal evidence suggests our trove was not forged. The MPE’s 
description (DJSP 2015) of its cache of documents closely resembles ours, including the 
“smokescreen” .mp3 files. Our trove’s internal consistency also makes a forgery by 
officials implausible; for example, the ledgers’ closing dates match their respective “last-
modified” dates in the file metadata. The PCC could have fabricated or falsified the data 
to mislead officials, but then why would it include so much evidence of criminal activity, 
linked to hundreds of individual names? That the documents were seized in raids along 
                                                           
6 See Protocol IRB17-1552 (Chicago). 
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with drugs and weapons casts further doubt on this possibility. As an additional check, 
we located media reports and official records validating numerous individual arrests 
and the single execution recorded in our data. 
A key concern for reliability is the incompleteness of our data on two fronts. First, as 
is often true of seized internal documents (Gutiérrez Sanín 2008), the trove is a non-
random sample covering less than a year in the life of one PCC administrative subunit, 
limiting our view geographically (only part of São Paulo state), structurally (only the 
street-level drug business, from the Interior level downward), and temporally. This 
could lead to bias if the region, administrative practice, and/or period we observe are 
exceptional. We draw on secondary evidence suggesting that operations elsewhere are 
broadly similar. However, the PCC is a large and evolving organization. Without 
additional systematic data we cannot be sure our findings apply beyond the time and 
places observed. 
Second, some documents are clearly missing: at least one monthly ledger and 
several “X-Ray” documents. These gaps seem minor—there is enough redundancy 
across documents to fill in most missing information, or make educated guesses. 
However, we cannot be sure that an entire document type is missing. The most relevant 
possibility is that violent punishments were carried out but not documented together 
with the non-violent punishments recorded by the disciplinarian. If true, our claim that 
the PCC relies almost exclusively on non-violent punishment would be biased. However, 
the recording of a single execution—as well as many non-violent punishments—in the 
bad-debt reports suggests that, had other executions occurred, we would have some 
record of them. 
The trove’s incompleteness, and any resulting bias, are unlikely to be due to 
deliberate withholding of documents. First, Denyer Willis watched the bureaucrat 
copying the trove, and saw no effort to selectively include or exclude material. Second, 
following Robertson (2007, 790–91), we can consider the likely motives of the officials 
who provided sensitive data. Similar data were provided to Brazilian media around this 
time; the resulting articles emphasized the PCC's size and brazenness, suggesting that if 
officials leaked selectively, they did so to foster a fearful image of the gang. Yet our trove 
lacks data on the PCC’s core drug markets (Greater São Paulo), and points to less 
sensational qualities than officials hypothetically sought to convey. Our informant might 
have sought to counteract prior leaks, but handing a carefully curated data trove to a 
then-graduate student seems like a suboptimal way to do so. In any case, the caveats 
above apply to any bias, whether accidental or deliberate.  
A final reliability concern involves interpretation. Formatting, orthography, and 
accounting conventions are extremely erratic; nicknames, abbreviations, slang, and 
code-words are ubiquitous and inconsistent. While both authors are fluent in 
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Portuguese and familiar with gang tropes, the nature of the data called for thoughtful 
approaches to analysis and, at times, careful conjecture.  
To “stay true” to the data, we conducted our analysis before turning to additional 
sources for triangulation and context. The MPE’s analysis and secondary sources largely 
corroborate our assessment of the PCC’s structure and interpretation of key terms. Two 
additional data sources come from the authors’ field research. The first is a smaller trove 
of seized PCC documents (henceforth S2) obtained by Denyer Willis via a different state 
source. Unlike our primary trove, S2 covers Greater São Paulo, but thinly; it covers a 
wider variety of PCC administrative subunits, including prison administration, but does 
not contain punishment records. Because of S2’s variegated but limited nature, we do 
not systematically analyze it. Rather, it corroborates some findings, and provides 
context about the PCC’s larger structure and division of labor. Second, we draw on 
Lessing’s ongoing study of the PCC’s expansion throughout Brazil, including interviews 
with incarcerated PCC members, state officials, and favela residents.7 This study 
excludes São Paulo state to focus on PCC expansion, so it cannot directly corroborate 
our data. However, it includes places like Paraná state that resemble São Paulo’s 
Interior in terms of PCC penetration and distance from São Paulo city.  
FINDINGS 
Organizational Structure 
The PCC has a sophisticated bureaucratic structure, made up of executive and 
managing committees (sintonias, literally “getting in tune”) for different functions, 
replicated across multiple administrative levels. Our data directly confirm the existence 
of at least three levels, Regionals, Interior, and at the very top, the Sintonia Geral e 
Final (which we call “Central Management”). Composed of the PCC’s ranking leaders, 
mostly housed together in a single prison, Central Management has final authority over 
the entire organization inside and outside prison. We observe this authority in the 
communiqué (salve geral) and “aid bank” documents discussed below.  
Journalistic accounts and the MPE’s analysis (DJSP 2015) report that beneath 
Central Management lie four main branches, also coordinated by sintonias: the prison 
system (sistema), the “street” (rua), other states beyond São Paulo (estados), and a 
“support” branch (apoio) overseeing numerous specialized sintonias.8 The “street” 
branch has eight geographic subdivisions: five for the capital city and one each for the 
                                                           
7 This study received separate, full-board approval: Protocol IRB16-1521. 
8 Including membership dues (cebola), welfare assistance for members (ajuda), lawyers 
(gravatas, literally, “neckties”), and cigarettes (cigarro). 
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São Paulo suburbs (ABC), the port city of Santos and coastal lowlands (Baixada 
Santista), and the remainder of the state (Interior).  
The PCC’s division of the Interior into Regional subunits follows São Paulo state’s 
official telephone area codes (Figure 3). Our documents refer to the Interior as 
comprising Regionals 12 and 14-19. Beyond references to “Capital” as an administrative 
unit, our documents shed no light on how Regionals 11 (Greater São Paulo) and 13 
(Baixada Santista) are administered. In the Interior, our data show, Regional-level 
administrators interact directly with individual dealers in over one hundred quebradas 
(“locales”, mostly single municipalities in our data); the Regionals answer to the Interior 
which in turn answers to Central Management, as in the MPE’s analysis. 
 
Figure 3. PCC Administrative Structure and Drug Trafficking in São Paulo’s 
Interior. “Regionals” are defined and numbered by telephone area codes; the Interior 
administrative unit covers Regionals 12 and 14-19. Circles represent the number of 
unique dealers (members and affiliates) per municipality who received consignments in 
our individual-level data. No consignments went to Regional 18 in the period observed, 
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though outstanding debt indicates prior consignments were made. A separate “R18 
Registry” lists members there, indicated with stars. 
Replicated across this vertical structure is a horizontal division of labor into 
institutionalized job posts (responsas). At each level, there is a Financial, Disciplinary, 
and General Manager or Council, and other key posts like bookkeeper (livro, “book”) 
and messenger (jato, “jet”). Posts are reportedly unpaid (Barbieri 2014), and our 
documents contain no record of salaries. One-year bans on holding posts are common 
punishments, one reason why rotation is frequent.  
Our data tell us little about how the PCC operates inside prison. It does confirm that 
the collection of members’ dues (a monthly fee plus obligatory participation in a raffle) 
is separate from the administration of the street-level drug trade. Our primary trove 
covers only the latter, whereas S2 includes files from the dues unit, confirming oversight 
by Central Management.  
Drug Trafficking Operations 
Consignment-Based Business Model. Roughly half the trove concerns the financial side 
of the PCC’s drug operation, detailing an elaborate consignment system for retailing 
crack, cocaine, and marijuana. Consignment differs from two more commonly observed 
models of drug retailing: “freelance” operations where individual dealers purchase their 
supplies up front from wholesalers, and “franchise-model” firms, whose owners pay 
dealers fixed salaries or commissions and claim residual profits (Johnson, Hamid, and 
Sanabria 1991). Each model has strengths and weaknesses. Levitt and Venkatesh (2000) 
report that the takeover of a Chicago drug market from a gang employing a freelance 
model by a more sophisticated gang using a franchise model led to a tripling of profits; 
they attribute this to the severe credit constraints endemic to freelance systems. 
Hagedorn (1994) also finds centralized, business-model retailing operations to be highly 
profitable, but more visible and hence vulnerable to law enforcement, and less adaptable 
to changing circumstances.  
Similar dynamics prevailed in many Brazilian cities, including São Paulo prior to 
the PCC’s widespread involvement, where the concentration of retail drug markets 
varied as smaller firms expanded into freelancers’ territory while larger firms fell prey to 
repression and succession battles (Lessing 2008). For decades the key exception was 
Rio’s CV, which has always been organized on the franchise model, as a confederation of 
bosses running their own firms, with hierarchies, salaried or commission-based posts, 
and a local monopoly within his turf (Grillo 2013; Misse 2011). While the CV has 
survived and at times proven quite lucrative, it has suffered both intense militarized 
state repression and predation by corrupt police, losing considerable ground since 
2008. 
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 The PCC’s consignment model constitutes a middle path, alleviating the credit 
constraints of freelance operations by extending microcredit to dealers, while avoiding 
the risks and costs of maintaining local monopolies over retail turf associated with 
hierarchical models.9 The consignment model also provides money-making 
opportunities for members and affiliates while isolating these from the PCC’s collective 
(and collectivist) endeavors. On the other hand, it creates agency problems, requiring 
mechanisms to track dealers’ debts and induce timely repayment. 
Profits Fund Collective Goods.  How profitable is the PCC’s drug business? The 
timing of drug consigning and repayment coupled with the relatively short period we 
observe complicates estimation. Nonetheless, the non-payment rate on consignment 
debt appears to be less than the Interior’s markup, suggesting the business is basically 
profitable. In terms of cash flow, total revenues equal total outlays, with no profits 
explicitly reported. However, reported expenses include costs of a major transportation 
network for incarcerated members’ families and other welfare benefits. Overall, we 
conclude that the business made enough “profit” to finance this network and replenish 
its drug inventory. We turn to the details. 
In our data, crack is by far the dominant economic activity (accounting for 92 
percent of revenue), followed by powder cocaine, with marijuana a distant third. The 
Interior makes wholesale purchases of drugs (100-500kg in our sample) from 
unspecified “suppliers”. Drugs are disbursed among the Regionals in lots of 5–103kg, 
and thence consigned (at a markup) to individual dealers. Dealers can be baptized PCC 
members (irmãos, “brothers”) or un-baptized “affiliates” (companheiros), and can 
obtain consignments of virtually any size, for which they incur debt at a fixed per-kilo 
rate of BRL 8,500 (USD 4,552) for crack and BRL 5,000 (USD 2,678) for cocaine.10 No 
marijuana consignments occur in the period we observe, although small outstanding 
debts indicate that previous consignments occurred.  
 The Interior purchases crack from its supplier at a flat rate of BRL 6500/kg, 
retaining a BRL 2,000/kg, (30.7 percent) markup. Our data contain one wholesale 
marijuana purchase of 500kg at BRL700/kg but no consignments to dealers, and 
                                                           
9 Our primary trove indicates that the Interior operated on a purely consignment basis; 
S2 shows that in Greater São Paulo, the PCC complements consignment with direct 
operation of drug retailing points (bicas). Conversely, Misse (2011) reported that Rio’s 
CV operated on a consignment basis in the 1990s, while Grillo (2013, 83) found that the 
CV “no longer” employed consignment. 
10 This price differential suggests that powder cocaine is highly diluted; a note repeated 
in several weekly ledgers confirms this: “the 20[kg] of pure [cocaine] in our stockpile 
has been cut into 120kg of cocaine for retail sale.”  
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consignments of cocaine at BRL 5000/kg but no wholesale purchases, so we cannot 
calculate either markup. Wholesale purchases are paid in installments; for example, a 
note in the December 2011 ledger (Figure 4) discusses the purchase of 150kg of crack at 
BRL 6500/kg (for a total of BRL 975,000), stating that two payments have already been 
made, and that BRL 63,576.50 “remains to be paid to the supplier”. The same note 
details the disbursement of 150kg of crack to the Regionals, along with their 
corresponding increases in the Interior’s outstanding debt at the BRL 8500/kg rate 
(totaling BRL 1,275,000).  
 
 
Figure 4. Typical Ledger Note Detailing Bulk Drug Purchase by Interior 
from Unidentified “Supplier” and Marked-up Disbursements to Regionals. 
Original formatting and orthography maintained. 
 
The fact that the Interior makes bulk purchases (partially) on credit suggests that 
the “supplier” could be PCC Central Management, essentially consigning large 
shipments to the Interior. However, in contrast to Regionals’ debt to the Interior, the 
documents never mention an Interior debt to Central Management; rather, outstanding 
debts to suppliers are noted haphazardly in text boxes pasted into ledger spreadsheets, 
and installment payments are recorded as business expenses. Moreover, the marijuana 
wholesale purchase is described as “for the Capital” (hence its disbursement does not 
appear in our data) while the 120kg of powder cocaine the Interior had on hand in 
December was “being disbursed, with 30 to the Capital and 90[kg] to the Interior.” The 
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only other recorded financial interactions between the Interior and the rest of the 
organization are two business expenses totaling BRL 57,000 to Central Management for 
a “project” (progresso) in March.11 Many potential financial and logistical arrangements 
between the Interior, the Capital, and Central Management are consistent with these 
limited observations. 
There is significant regional variation in trafficking volume. Regional 19, containing 
Campinas, the second largest city in the state, was responsible for 47 percent of 
incoming revenue, while the sparsely populated Regional 18 received no new 
consignments and made a single small debt repayment. There is also temporal variation, 
with the largest disbursements in late November 2011 and February 2012, and none in 
March or the first three weeks of April (Figure 5). Seasonal variation is a plausible 
explanation: the end of November marks the beginning of summer in Brazil, and the 
lead-up to Christmas vacation. Summer continues through Carnaval, which fell on 
February 17-21 in 2012, when drug consumption is probably very high. Work rhythms 
resume in March, and it is possible that retail drug markets contract accordingly.  
                                                           
11 Progresso usually means “the drug business”, but can refer to other collective projects, 
such as a planned prison break or bank robbery (Biondi 2016, 170). 
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Figure 5: Drug Disbursements by Regional. Symbols indicate disbursements for 
which the X-Ray documents provide complete (*) or partial (†) data on individual 
consignments. 
 
We do not observe dealers’ income from drug sales, nor the markup they charge 
consumers. We do, however, observe the repayment of consignments by the Regionals 
to the Interior, which is quite variable likely due to the vagaries of retail-level drug sales 
and the fates of individual dealers. Figure 6 shows the Interior’s outstanding debt 
(accounts receivable) and revenues from debt repayments over the period observed. 
Overall, the Interior took in BRL 3,938,605 and made BRL 3,425,000 in new 
consignments; an additional BRL 502,647.50 of debt disappears from the books, due, 
we conjecture, to a write-off of uncollectable debt.  
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Figure 6: Interior’s Total Outstanding Debt (Accounts Receivable) and Debt 
Repayments by Regional. A large debt reduction in excess of repayments occurs 
between the January 31 and February 7 weekly ledgers; the January monthly ledger that 
should explain it is missing, and no other such reduction occurs in the data. We 
conjecture it was a one-time write-off authorized by Central Management. 
 
Is the PCC’s drug business profitable? The Interior stood to make BRL 2000/kg on 
the 550kg it consigned; assuming the same markup (30.7 percent) for cocaine, and that 
the 19 weeks we observe were representative, an upper-bound estimate for yearly profits 
would be BRL 3,297,895 (USD 1,766,319). However, consignment debts are not always 
repaid in a timely fashion, or at all.  
We estimate a non-repayment rate of 14-27 per cent based on an analysis of 
“relatório” (report) documents. These running tallies of overdue debts among dealers 
who have gone missing, died, or been arrested or expelled are not consistently organized 
or dated, and do not tell us the share of loans repaid on-time. However, two reports list 
“total overdue [debt],” “total current [debt]” (i.e. recently issued consignments) and 
“total debt” (the sum of overdue and current debt) for the Interior, allowing us to 
estimate the non-payment rate as: total overdue / total debt. This estimate is biased, 
since changes in current debt (new accounts receivable) affect it independently of the 
repayment rate on prior debts. Moreover, these line items occur twice in each report, 
22 
 
consecutively, under different headings, with different values for “overdue debt.” Figure 
7 illustrates this, combining the two reports, maintaining the original terms and 
formatting, and adding translations and our non-payment rate estimates. We suspect 
that the bottom entries (débito do Interior) exclude debts considered irrecoverable, but 
the debt for marijuana increases between the top and bottom entries (the Regional 
subtotals show similar increases for crack and cocaine). Regardless, most of the 
estimates fall below the 23.5 percent non-payment rate at which the PCC would break 
even on its 30.7 percent markup on crack. Since many of these overdue debts had been 
on the books for over a year, this seems like a manageable level of non-payment. 
 
  
Figure 7: Estimated Non-Payment Rates, Based on Bad-Debt Reports’ 
Totals For Overdue and Current Debt. Besides our estimates, labels, and 
translations (shaded), the original formatting is maintained.    
 
The Interior appears not to owe its overdue debts as accounts payable to Central 
Management, but it is under pressure to balance its books from Central Management, 
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which can cancel debts it deems uncollectible, as this note in the earliest bad-debt report 
indicates:  
Report of debts among the expelled and of unknown whereabouts who have not 
settled their debts until today whose values are just bulking up the regional 
spreadsheets and making it difficult to balance our books, and we are forwarding 
these names to Central Management, to be analyzed case by case and together 
with us from the Interior begin to remove from our ledgers this backlog of values 
that we are not managing to collect.12 
Our trove also contains a salve geral (a communiqué from Central Management to all 
members) dated (and last modified) January 23, 2012:  
Central Management hereby communicates, by means of this memo, to all those 
with outstanding debts with the drug trade and finance sector to take 
responsibility and pay off your debts. 
From the date February 20, 2012, those who have not zeroed their overdue debts 
will be communicated within the central disciplinary sector (nossa disciplina). It 
will not be necessary for the regional disciplinarian to personally meet each one 
to let them know, since from now on [if one’s allotted time for repayment] has 
expired he is automatically suspended[.] Everyone knows their responsibility, 
and defaulting on debts sets back all of the family’s [i.e. PCC’s] activities. 
Around the time of this salve, we observe a permanent and unexplained reduction 
in the Regionals’ debt to the Interior by BRL 502,647.50, about one-third of the total 
outstanding. We conjecture that this was a one-time write-off authorized by Central 
Management, in conjunction with the disciplinary reform described in the salve. We 
note, however, that no reduction occurred in the Interior’s accounts-payable debt to its 
wholesale “supplier” (which may or may not be Central Management), which received 
payment in full for the wholesale purchases we observe. 
No “profits” appear in the Interior’s cash flows, recorded as revenues and expenses 
(entrada e saida de dinheiro), but significant expenditures on collective benefits for 
members’ families appear as “expenses”. In these ledger entries, revenue consists of 
dealers’ debt repayments, while expenses are divided into wholesale drug purchases—
about 90 percent of outflows—and operating expenses that account for the rest. 
Critically, operating expenses are dominated by expenditures on an elaborate network of 
vans and busses for transporting families of incarcerated members to far-flung prisons 
                                                           
12 Grammatical errors and color formatting appear in the original. 
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for visitation (Figure 8). These expenditures total about BRL85,000/month (USD 
45,525), while traditional business expenses like cell phones and courier services 
account for only about BRL 20,000. The remaining cash on hand, anywhere from BRL 
500,000-1,000,000, goes toward bulk drug purchases, often paying down the Interior’s 
debt to its supplier for prior shipments.  
 
Figure 8: “Operating Expenses” (Saida de Dinheiro) in Monthly 
Ledgers. This heading includes welfare benefits for members’ families, but excludes 
wholesale drug purchases.  
Thus, although the Interior records no profits per se, it clearly directs revenue from 
its drug business toward collective benefits for members. This collectivist approach is 
echoed in another document proposing Regional “aid banks” that provide loans of guns 
and money to members recently released from prison, to help them “get on their feet.” 
Each bank should have on hand BRL 500,000 (USD 267,800) and a standing inventory 
of twenty automatic rifles, fifteen submachine guns, fifty pistols, thirty grenades, and 
twenty revolvers. Gun loans must meet a “principle of proportionality” in which “nobody 
requests a machine gun to rob a car.” In return, the PCC asks only for “increased 
commitment to assume existing responsibilities”. The proposal, directed at Central 
Management, exemplifies how collectivist norms infuse the PCC’s rhetoric and praxis: 
by establishing these banks, the proposers write, “The family puts the theory of equality 
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into practice, with criminals aiding criminals, recovering the spirit of struggle 
surrounding our organization.” A note from Central Management approving the project 
suggests this appeal was successful. 
Competitive Retail Drug Markets. The “X-Ray” documents shed light on the 
structure of drug markets in the Interior. Each records individual consignments to 
dealers, organized by municipality, for a single drug disbursement (crack or cocaine in 
our trove). These are compiled first by Regional bookkeepers, then merged into a master 
document for the Interior. We have the complete master document for the November 
2011 crack disbursement; in the other four cases, we are missing X-Ray documents for 
some Regionals (Figure 5).  
Pooling the available X-Ray documents, we observe 1,134 consignments to about 
500 individual dealers13 operating in 89 municipalities (Figure 3). These are 
conservative estimates , since there are likely active dealers in other municipalities who 
did not receive consignments in these specific disbursements. In particular, Regional 18 
received no consignments but carried debts, indicating that it sometimes receives 
consignments. Including the municipalities mentioned in a Regional 18 membership 
registry (the only such registry in our trove) and the “bad-debt reports” yields 117 
municipalities with PCC activity. As Figure 3 reveals, PCC activity is concentrated in the 
most populous municipalities, encompassing roughly 14 million people, or about 69 
percent of the Interior’s population.  
The median, and modal consignments for crack were 500g, with 100g, 200g, and 
1kg consignments also quite common. However, many odd-sized consignments (e.g., 
46g or 2640g) occur, suggesting that dealers can request any size consignment they 
wish. Cocaine saw smaller consignments overall, though this could be due to the limited 
sample size (one disbursement). Figure 9 plots histograms; numbers on the horizontal 
axes represent sizes with at least one observation.  
                                                           
13 Dealers are identified by nickname, and some common nicknames (e.g., “Fatso”) 
appear in multiple, often distant municipalities within single disbursements. Assuming 
one dealer per nickname across municipalities yields 488 dealers; assuming one dealer 
per nickname per municipality yields 632 dealers. 
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Figure 9: Histograms of Drug Consignments to Individual Dealers by Size.  
 
Retail drug markets appear to be relatively competitive. We analyze the crack 
disbursement for which we have complete consignment-level data (November 2011), as 
well as the single cocaine disbursement (December 2011). Figure 10 shows that for both 
drugs, the number of active dealers in each of municipality is correlated with the total 
amount consigned to that city, so that larger markets have more dealers operating. 
Consequently, the degree of concentration (i.e. the mean consignment per dealer 
operating in each locale) is essentially uncorrelated with the total size of consignments 
to that locale. In fact, the “biggest fish” seem to operate in smaller ponds. These data 
corroborate Feltran’s (2018) claim that the PCC does not attempt to monopolize retail 
trade.  
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Figure 10: Number and Average “Size” of Dealers per Municipality. Points 
represent locales (quebradas, in our sample almost all municipalities) that received 
drug consignments in the respective disbursements. The top panels show how many 
dealers received consignments in each municipality; the bottom panels show the 
average consignment per dealer in each municipality. 
 
Discipline and Punishment 
Internal discipline is a challenge for all organizations, but it is a critical one for the 
PCC’s drug operation because of dealers’ temptation to default. While we might imagine 
repayment, and gang rules in general, being enforced at gunpoint, there are reasons to 
avoid extreme punishment. Dealers face great uncertainty and risk, and outcomes are 
not perfectly correlated with effort. Under those circumstances overly harsh 
punishments can encourage exit. More broadly, the PCC’s normative mission centers on 
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proceder, or proper criminal comportment (Biondi 2016; Marques 2010); its moral 
authority could be undercut if punishment were seen as arbitrary, disproportionate, or 
vindictive.  
We present two main descriptive findings. First, the PCC, at least in the Interior 
during the period observed, relies overwhelmingly on suspensions and expulsions. Of 
the 203 individual punishments documented in our trove, only one—an execution—
involved physical violence. Second, the PCC maintains a centralized, queryable system 
of “criminal criminal records” of members’ and affiliates’ history, including past 
infractions. Punishment is highly bureaucratized, involving significant, standardized 
paperwork and numerous mechanisms for administrative review. Though strict and 
meticulous, the PCC is t also clearly concerned with fairness and “hearing out” suspects 
of wrongdoing. While we lack systematic data for other Brazilian factions, the contrast 
with Misse’s description of Rio’s CV is startling: “Non-repayment [of debts] is 
interpreted as fraud, theft, or error, and the debtor on the first repeat offense is killed in 
a public ritual of cruelty” (2011, 237). 
Punishment is Mild. Punishment data come from several different sources within 
our documents. The most direct evidence comes from the disciplinarian’s handwritten 
notebook (DHN) and Word files (DWF). DHN contains 21 standardized punishment 
records, blank templates and instructions for filling them in, as well as other notes and 
records. DWF contains 100 Word files: 95 unique, individual punishment records, 3 
duplicate records, and 2 punishment-record templates. Because DWF does not duplicate 
any records from DHN, while both cover punishments that occurred from late 2011 
through September 2012, we suspect the disciplinarian was still digitizing the records in 
DHN when he was arrested in early October. Another file, “Anotações do Caderno Parte 
1,” henceforth “Notes,” contains 25 additional unique records from November 2011 
through January 2012. These three sources provide the best measure of the relative 
proportions of different punishments meted out over time. Additionally, the bad-debt 
reports (relatórios) mention punishments in the context of overdue debts belonging to 
members who have been expelled or killed; as such, they capture only a subset of total 
expulsions and executions, and exclude suspensions entirely.  
We coded the punishments recorded in these four sources by type (Figure 11). The 
overwhelming majority of punishments are 15-20 day suspensions, but a significant 
number of expulsions also occurred. This is particularly true of the period covered by 
the bad-debt reports. 
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Figure 11: Punishments Recorded in Disciplinarian's Handwritten 
Notebook (DHN) and Word Files (DWF), “Notes” File, and Bad-Debt 
Reports. Date range of punishments recorded within each source as noted. 
 
No executions appear among the DHN, DWF, and “Notes” files; we suspect that 
none occurred during the periods covered, but cannot rule out the possibility that 
executions occurred but were not recorded alongside other punishments. However, the 
bad-debt reports do document an execution, strongly suggesting that the PCC does not 
systematically hide violent punishments. Moreover, this likely represents all cases of 
executed debtors, because these reports detail uncollectable debts to be written off by 
Central Management, and, as the authors note, “we know that the debts of killed 
members are automatically written off.” Executions of members without debts would 
not be reported here, but we suspect such executions are rare, since theft from the 
organization is a prime motivation for execution. More broadly, the entire trove evinces 
the PCC’s fervor for recordkeeping, suggesting that, like many regimes, it keeps careful 
track of even its most repressive actions. In any case, only 1 out of 203 punishments in 
our data corresponded to an execution. 
 Most punishments were the result of the PCC’s automatic, graded punishment 
system for overdue drug debt, laid out in this template from DHN. 
 Members: first suspension is 15 days. If they pay, they’re back, if they don’t pay 
they’re out of the Comando.  
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 2nd suspension: 90 days automatically and 15 more days to pay up. If they don’t 
pay, they’re out. 
3rd suspension: Automatic Expulsion. And they enter an “affiliate’s twenty-day 
suspension.” 
“Affiliates” are immediately subject to twenty-day suspensions when they do not 
pay.  
The January 2012 salve quoted above suggests that this automatic-suspension policy 
was new, although numerous first suspensions occur in the months prior as well.  
 Expulsion usually comes as an automatic response to non-payment of debts, but 
we also observe expulsions for being “out of touch” (falta de sintonia), and for lack of 
“vision,” “responsibility,” and “transparency.” Expulsion is considered a major 
punishment and bureaucratic safeguards are in place to ensure that it is not wrongfully 
applied, as a note in DHN explains: 
All Expulsions must be sent through a disciplinarian or general manager. Never 
record an Expulsion reported by a member who does not hold a post (responsa) 
nor without the knowledge of Central Management or of the Regional. … We 
bookkeepers should never record an Expulsion without first having the Summary 
(Resumo) from Central Management. 
Multiple references to the Resumo, in our trove and interviews, indicate that it is a 
mechanism by which Central Management both authorizes individual punishments and 
conveys the relevant information to branch officials, including bookkeepers. We now 
explore the PCC’s information-sharing mechanisms. 
Centralized “Criminal Criminal Records” Support Voluntary Reporting. 
The very production and centralization of the punishment records in our trove 
constitutes an important empirical observation. All large organizations face the 
challenge of keeping track of members’ performance; for criminal organizations the 
challenge is exacerbated, since records can be seized by authorities and used as 
evidence. Many gangs maintain, at best, a membership roster, with reputation based on 
collective memory, word of mouth, and codes of learned behavior (Gambetta 2009). 
This can become problematic in large, dispersed organizations.  
The PCC, in contrast, has developed a system of uniform personnel records 
consisting of standardized data fields covering individuals’ history with the 
organization; these (empty) fields compose the punishment-record templates in our 
trove (Figure 12). These same data fields appear in other PCC documents, particularly 
when a member or affiliate comes under scrutiny. Because these data “follow” 
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individuals, and because they include previous punishments (punição anterior)14 and 
the bureaucratic processes that accompanied them, we call them “criminal criminal 
records.”15 While we lack similar data for other gangs, intelligence officials in seven 
Brazilian states believe that no other faction approaches this level of recordkeeping. One 
leader of a CV-allied faction admitted having difficulty maintaining even a basic roster, 
and being unable to incorporate “previous punishments” and other data fields.16 
 
Figure 12. “Criminal Criminal Records”: Data Fields in Punishment-
Record Templates 
 
Explicit instructions accompany the templates in DHN: “When registering a 
suspension, all personal data is required. Name, nickname [etc.]… if he’s received a 
punishment by the family [i.e. the PCC] and if so, its locale, motive, and date.” For 
                                                           
14 The recurrence of “punição” (punishment) throughout our documents contrasts with 
Biondi’s claim that “[PCC] Brothers do not use the term ‘punishment’ [punição],” 
preferring “consequences” as a way to “turn sanctions into the expected, or naturalized, 
results of one’s own actions” (2016, 80). This may reflect the PCC’s linguistic norms 
evolving over time, a process Biondi observes and discusses in later work (2018). 
15 PCC members often refer to these as cadastros (registers) or, collectively and 
humorously, as their cara-crachá (a members-only credentialing system, as at a private 
club). 
16 Interview, August 28, 2018. 
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expulsions, additional information is required: motive, locale, date, and 
acompanhamento (“follow-up”), a list of PCC officials involved in judging the case, 
running from the Regional disciplinarian up through Central Management, whose 
authorization must be conveyed via Summary (Resumo). The two digital templates in 
DWF appear to further standardize PCC recordkeeping: all subsequent punishment 
records (by last-modified date) follow these templates, while earlier ones present the 
same data in varied formats. The disciplinarian himself may have innovated, or simply 
adopted a system-wide innovation. 
 This data reappears when individuals are mentioned in other documents. For 
example, the bad-debt reports contain 63 unique records of expulsions for overdue debt. 
Although these reports focus on tracking and recovering debts rather than punishment 
per se, they recapitulate key data from individuals’ “criminal criminal records.” Figure 
13 provides an anonymized example, with data-field names and key entries translated, 
and the original formatting preserved.  
 
Figure 13: Example of “Criminal Criminal Record” Data Reappearing in a 
Bad-Debt Report. This individual’s prior punishment for a private debt seems to have 
influenced his expulsion in June 2010. He was contacted 14 months later by the PCC 
and ended up paying back a third of his outstanding debt. 
 These cross-listings strongly suggest that “criminal criminal records” can be 
queried by members, at least those occupying posts. For example, the entry in Figure 13 
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was prepared sometime between July 2011 (the last date mentioned in the entry) and 
September 27, 2012 (the file’s last-modified date), but references an expulsion from July 
2010. File metadata reveals that these reports’ authors are not the same as the 
punishment records’, and the former were unlikely to know the relevant facts offhand. 
Key elements of members’ “criminal criminal record” are similarly reproduced across 
PCC documents, suggesting that the underlying data are accessible, possibly by 
requesting a Summary from Central Management.  
Lessing’s interviews with imprisoned PCC leaders in other states corroborate this 
view. One mentioned a queryable “center” (central) of personnel records in São Paulo.17 
Another explained that newly arrived inmates are expected to report the information in 
their “criminal criminal record” to local PCC representatives, including “previous 
punishments”:  
BL: …I’m asking because I’m doing a study with [PCC] documents from São 
Paulo, … and they always note “previous punishments.” 
I: “Previous punishment” is asked about. If someone shows up and doesn’t report 
it, “Ah, I have a punishment in São Paulo but I won’t report it here.” But 
management is centralized (Mas a geral é uma só).    
BL: You would have a way to find that out? 
I: Absolutely. […] We can find that out here. I’m just the representative for this 
wing, but there is a General Manager (geral do estado) for the whole state, he has 
our registry (cadastro) and it will go into the Summary (Resumo), the Summary 
records all of Brazil, it will be noted there in the registry, dates of baptism by his 
godfathers… 
BL: Will “previous punishments” also be recorded? 
I: “Previous punishments,” absolutely. Every act is recorded there. 
BL: But you guys, being in other states [i.e. not São Paulo], do you have a way to 
consult it?  
I: We do. 
BL: Send a message, “Hey, can you look this guy up?”  
I: We do, we do.18  
 
Intriguingly, this ability to query—combined with moral sanction for lack of 
transparency—seems to induce an equilibrium in which truthful provision of personal 
information is the dominant strategy, and querying is rarely necessary: 
I: Every time a member or affiliate arrives here in our wing, he comes to us, and if 
he has something to tell us, if he has a debt with the Comando, he will pass along 
                                                           
17 Interview, July 25, 2017. 
18 Interview, July 3, 2017.  
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the information. Transparency speaks volumes in a situation like that. If you 
arrive here full of lies, and later we get confirmation that those situations were 
true that you failed to tell us about, that generates a different type of situation. 
[…]  
BL: You won’t trust the guy as much? 
I: Right. […] All of us, whenever there is contact. If I were released today, I’ll find 
the Comando wherever I end up, I will seek out the representative of that city, 
that neighborhood, that disciplinarian, that prison unit, and I’ll pass along my 
record (cadastro). I will have to act with transparency, because a Comando 
member is like that, he is transparency, he cannot lie.19 
 
Our data support the idea of a voluntary-transparency equilibrium, documenting 
multiple expulsions for “lies” or “lack of transparency,” and a possible example of the 
equilibrium at work, from a note on an uncollected debt from an imposter: 
…Upon incarceration he opened his heart… he told the truth that he wasn’t a member 
and had been using the name [of a member] while in the street. 
With staggering irony, the PCC appears to have built what the state has conspicuously 
failed to: a true panopticon, in which the possibility of being observed at any time leads 
all inmates to act as though they were being observed always.  
DISCUSSION 
We argue that four central empirical findings—the PCC’s consignment-based drug 
trafficking business, its relatively mild and “sympathetic” punishment regime, and 
resource-intensive recordkeeping, and its use of profits for collective benefits—are 
causally interconnected. Analyzed together, they reveal a powerful approach to criminal 
governance that has probably facilitated the PCC’s unprecedented growth and resilience.  
One advantage of the PCC’s consignment model is its potential for flexible, 
decentralized expansion. Yet consignment only works if dealers regularly repay their 
debts in a timely fashion. Dealers have incentives to pay up and receive the next 
consignment, but in the rough-and-tumble world of drug dealing there are countless 
frictions that can make delay or default tempting. Hence the need, articulated in our 
documents, to “lean on” debtors. Yet the very decentralization that consignment 
permits, particularly in “frontier” areas such as São Paulo’s Interior, means that 
physically coercing individual street dealers could be costly or impractical.  
The PCC has an elegant solution to this agency problem. First, it is inadvertently 
aided by the state, which—through its mass incarceration policies—directs significant 
                                                           
19 Ibid. 
35 
 
resources to arresting dealers and bringing them to places where the PCC can easily 
punish them: the prison system. Crackdowns that drive up incarceration rates (and at 
530 per 100,000 residents in 2016, São Paulo state’s is very high) raise dealers’ 
expected probability of being sent to a PCC-controlled prison, and hence increase the 
downside risk of running afoul of its disciplinarians (Lessing 2017).20 
Even in prison, though, the PCC metes out little physical punishment. We observe 
dozens of individual records of dealers imprisoned while holding debt; among these, 
only suspensions and expulsions are noted. This corroborates Dias and Salla’s (2013) 
finding that graded punishments replaced more violent and arbitrary sanctions within 
prison. Here too the PCC benefits from the actions of the state, which—despite extensive 
prison construction—maintains a burgeoning inmate population (over 237,000 as of 
2016) in conditions of intense overcrowding, precarious infrastructure, and insufficient 
and/or abusive guards. Under such conditions, the prospect of losing PCC protection 
and welfare is a powerful incentive for repayment.  
The PCC’s internal disciplinary system further amplifies the force of nonviolent 
punishments in two key ways. First, in combining automatic suspensions with a system 
of jury trials and appeals, the PCC guarantees procedural justice (Tyler 2003): sentences 
are handed down in a consistent, transparent, and non-arbitrary way. Mechanisms to 
avoid false positives ensure that only the guilty are punished.  
Second, the PCC’s “criminal criminal records” guarantee that infractions and 
resulting punishments become and remain common knowledge. PCC members, and 
potentially affiliates, can learn about someone’s past actions and make accurate 
inferences about their future reliability. Suspensions may carry only a minor direct cost 
in missed opportunities for profit, but, like low credit scores, they hurt members’ 
reputation in the eyes of potential future collaborators.  
Do members and affiliates in fact stigmatize the punished? Within prison, Dias and 
Salla note that even brief suspensions involve “losing social status before the prison 
population.” (2013, 404). In the urban periphery, Feltran’s (2010) account of a PCC-led 
trial of a non-member, accused of embezzling from a local non-PCC drug firm, is 
illustrative. The accused’s defense was strong and courageous, but a previous 30-day 
suspension counted against him, and he was sentenced to a beating. The true 
punishment, however, was the stigma attached to his conviction, as a relative explained: 
“He was completely demoralized in the world of crime, and there was no way he could 
return.” (Feltran 2010, 65). Our data suggests that this example is not atypical: of the 63 
                                                           
20 Even when state forces resort to lethal violence—São Paolo police killed 856 people in 
2016—it can strengthen the PCC, whose stated mission is to protect criminals against 
state oppression. 
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expulsions recorded in the “bad-debts” documents, 27 note that the expelled member 
fled his home municipality and could not be located.  
Of course, meticulous recordkeeping alone does not guarantee fairness or induce 
compliance; after all, many authoritarian regimes have kept detailed records of 
genocide, mass killings, and torture.21 Rather, recordkeeping works in conjunction with 
an efficacious and procedurally fair “criminal criminal justice” system to create the 
conditions for widespread voluntary compliance (Tyler 2003). The resulting system of 
governance, we argue, approximates Weber’s ideal type: “[legitimation of] domination 
by virtue of ‘legality,’ by virtue of the belief in the validity of legal statute and functional 
‘competence’ based on rationally created rules.” (1946, 79).  
Weber’s concepts are meant to be scientific and observable (1968, 215), but we 
rarely know whether subjects truly believe in the legitimacy of the authorities to which 
they submit (Wedeen 2015, xiv). PCC specialists disagree about this very point: in 
Biondi’s (2016) prison ethnography, PCC authority derives entirely from shared norms, 
whereas other scholars emphasize fear of punishment (Dias and Salla 2013; King and 
Valensia 2014).  
While our data cannot decide the question, our theory illuminates the potential 
complementarity between the PCC’s collectivist norms and its “criminal criminal 
justice” system. In our story, members know that suspensions and expulsions (1) reflect 
accurate assessments of behavior, (2) are carefully recorded and can be queried, and 
hence (3) are generally voluntarily reported to unfamiliar members, who will then (4) 
treat infractors accordingly. While such a system could plausibly be sustained on a 
purely materialistic, instrumental basis, norms can buttress each step: if the behavior in 
question is seen as unethical (and not merely prohibited), members are more likely to 
stigmatize transgressors. Punishment by an unreliable tyrant can be quite harsh, but it 
will carry little additional stigma if others perceive the accusation as potentially false or 
the violated rules as arbitrary. Punishment by a decentralized and deliberative network 
of dedicated volunteers committed to a clear set of rules can be mild precisely because 
its mere application is a trustworthy signal of rule-breaking to others. In the PCC’s case, 
those rules reflect shared norms of integrity and equanimity that, when collectively 
practiced, produce a better criminal underworld for everyone. Thus, their violation 
induces, in an organic way, a strong social stigma. Obsessive recordkeeping and a norm 
of transparency ensure this stigma will be long-lasting and far-reaching. 
Supporting the idea that norms play a key role in sustaining criminal governance, 
new factions throughout Brazil, often formed in opposition to PCC expansion, 
nonetheless borrow and adapt its normative language and appeals. As one informant 
                                                           
21 We thank an anonymous reviewer for this point. 
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from a state only partially dominated by the PCC told Lessing, “The PCC may not have 
won the war of territory, but it won the war of ideas.”22 The “aid bank” document 
discussed above, and at length in Denyer Willis (2014), exemplifies this: its authors 
invoke the PCC’s moral precepts to advocate, apparently successfully, for implementing 
a criminal redistributive mechanism. 
To clarify, our claim is not that legitimacy and a perception of fairness are necessary 
to generate compliance, nor that they always induce more compliance than brute 
coercion, at least locally. Had the PCC adopted harsher punishments, it is quite possible 
that non-payment rates would have been lower. Indeed, many expelled members simply 
flee rather than pay up; in one case, a member accused of unauthorized killing—an 
infraction punishable by death—is given a chance to collect evidence for his defense 
prior to PCC trial, and takes the opportunity to flee. Such under-punishment likely 
motivated the January 2012 salve, which made punishment marginally harsher in 
response to excessive outstanding debts. Yet this readjustment did not affect the overall 
mildness and procedurally transparent aspects of the PCC disciplinary regime. This 
suggests that Central Management takes a profit-satisficing approach, adjusting the 
harshness of its punishment practices to maintain basic profitability, but stopping short 
of draconian punishments that might undercut perceived legitimacy.  
This hypothesized prioritization of legitimate governance and procedural justice 
over profits finds evidentiary support in the PCC’s bookkeeping practices. Punishment 
records are decidedly more detailed and meticulous than the purely financial 
documents; the bad-debt reports—containing both financial and personnel data—offer 
the clearest evidence. Whereas each individual’s “criminal criminal record” is dutifully 
reproduced, including negotiated repayment schedules, excuses given, rumored 
whereabouts, and PCC personnel involved in punishment decisions, the actual debt 
totals are inconsistent and frequently differ from the sum of individual outstanding 
debts. The individual consignment data contain clerical errors; expense accounting in 
the ledgers is haphazard; and one major reduction in outstanding debt goes 
unaccounted for. However important bookkeeping is to the PCC’s successful scaling up 
of drug trafficking operations, financial efficiency does not seem to drive its embrace of 
bureaucracy. 
All of this suggests that the PCC views drug profits less as an end than as a 
necessary means to strengthen and expand the organization, a view consistent with its 
use of those profits to fund collective goods like transportation for members’ families. 
Indeed, the PCC seems to have deliberately designed flexible business-side rules in 
order to produce a perception of equanimity and fairness. The severest punishments are 
                                                           
22 Interview, Curitiba, August 2017. 
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reserved for betrayals of core organizational values; if that means a somewhat higher 
(but manageable) level of non-payment on debts, so be it.  
This view flows from the data in our trove, but is consistent with Marcola’s 
testimony concerning the “democratizing” reforms he implemented after his 2002 coup. 
These were meant to put an end to both the violence being meted out by the PCC’s 
founders and the extortionate “pyramid scheme” it supported:  
“The leadership was drunk with its own success […] and ended up committing 
atrocities worse than those they had sought to restrain […] It was a huge abuse of 
power, 80 or 90 inmates assassinated per year. […] From the moment that I 
distributed, that power was divided, the pyramid ended… from that moment on, my 
leadership also ended” (Marques 2010, 322-4). 
While we cannot know how a counterfactually draconian PCC would have fared, it is 
undeniable that PCC expansion accelerated after Marcola ended its founders’ harsh, 
personalistic rule. Perhaps the PCC’s apparent preference for legitimacy is part of a long 
con, trading short-run revenues for expansion but eventually reverting to predatory, 
profit-maximizing rule. A more plausible explanation is that establishing legitimacy is 
itself part of a long-term maximization strategy, one intriguingly anticipated in 
Skaperdas and Syropoulos’ “Gangs as Primitive States” (1997). These, they conjecture, 
“once established through coercion, [might] improve efficiency later on… [by] 
reduc[ing] the waste of resources associated with the use of force and protracted conflict 
if it could be done with minimal threat to their rule. One way to do that would be to 
convince their subjects of their rule’s legitimacy” (1997, 74). 
CONCLUSION 
We draw on internal PCC financial and disciplinary records to argue that it has 
developed a form of criminal governance characterized by rational-bureaucratic 
legitimacy. That is, its authority rests less on violence and the charismatic qualities of 
individual leaders—as in the CV and the pre-Marcola period of the PCC itself—than on 
the “legality of enacted rules and the right of those elevated to authority under such 
rules to issue commands” (Weber 1968). Naturally, the PCC only approximates Weber’s 
ideal type: occasional betrayals and brutal purges still occur, as do vestiges of 
charismatic authority—including Marcola himself, his protestations notwithstanding. 
Yet the PCC’s own trajectory recalls Weber’s “routinization of charisma” (1968), linking 
pre-modern and modern forms of governance. In a similar vein, upstart factions in 
Brazil’s poorer states often formally emulate the PCC’s codes, norms, and bureaucratic 
structure while generally failing to achieve “Weberian” efficiency, which should surprise 
few scholars of development. These echoes suggest connections among criminal 
governance, state-formation, and insurgency, to which we now turn. 
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 Scholars have long compared state-making to banditry and racketeering (e.g. Olson 
1993; Scott 2009; Tilly 1985). Up to a point, these metaphors can be fruitfully reversed 
to illuminate criminal governance. If California prison gangs function as Olsonion 
stationary bandits (Skarbek 2011), Brazilian prison-gang expansion has a Tillyian cast: 
the PCC made war, and war made the PCC. Like the CV before it, the PCC eliminated 
armed rivals within a delimited territory (the prison system), established a monopoly on 
the use of force, provided order in exchange for tribute, and proceeded to expand to new 
territories (the urban periphery) where the process repeated. This process both fed and 
was fed by the factions’ development of internal organizational structures and outward 
governance practices. The PCC’s structure and approach to governance diverged from 
the CV’s, and so too have its ambitions. In Tillyian fashion, thirty years of increasingly 
competitive expansion have left the most territorially extensive criminal faction with the 
most sophisticated bureaucracy and organizational structure.  
The Tillyian framework is misleading in at least two respects, however. First, 
prison-gang governance and expansion do not occur in a stateless realm. In the spaces 
where criminal organizations arise and assert control (prisons, urban peripheries, illicit 
markets) the state may be weak, but it is far from absent. Indeed, these spaces are 
shaped and often constituted by state policies and actions, and are embedded within 
state-led societies. Tilly’s proto-states clash on an empty stage, constrained only by 
geography; the topology that constrains prison-gang expansion—prison vs. street, state 
vs. federal prisons—is primarily legal and jurisdictional, state-made. Critically, so are 
many of the mechanisms by which prison gangs traverse these obstacles: the flux of 
criminals through the prison system, their segregation by prison officials according to 
gang affiliation, and the transfer of gang leaders across state lines. Above all, the 
governance that prison gangs establish usually overlaps or meshes with state authority, 
at least partially. While this intersection can be violent and antagonistic, it can also 
exhibit quiet coexistence and even mutual dependence, through an everyday 
“consensus” that can be broken and mended (Denyer Willis 2015). Prison-gang 
governance is thus deeply paradoxical, both opposed to and symbiotic with the state.  
 Second, any legitimacy in criminal governance is, by its nature, bottom-up. In 
Tilly’s cynical view, “Legitimacy is the probability that other authorities will act to 
confirm the decisions of a given authority” (1985, 171). If this view is contentious with 
respect to states, it is clearly wrong with respect to criminal groups. Factions are illegal, 
regularly demonized and actively combated by state authorities. While states do, in 
practice, defer to criminal authority in prisons and peripheries, such deference is 
shameful and thus closeted. Similarly, although factions may resemble social 
movements in their self-professed struggles against oppression, they remain movements 
by, of, and for criminals: factions may fight for inmates’ human rights, but they also 
have, since their founding, trafficked drugs, organized robberies, and orchestrated 
prison breaks and mass violence on the streets. No faction has articulated a real political 
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program, including the PCC—despite its nickname “the party of crime.” As such, 
factions lie beyond the pale of mainstream civil society and politics. If the PCC’s 
governance is legitimate, it is because the marginalized people it governs see it as such. 
In their oppositional stance, factions resemble insurgencies. Both go beyond 
social movements by drawing on episodes of state oppression to mobilize violent 
opposition. Both seem to benefit from an ability to motivate members with ideological 
rather than purely materialistic appeals (Gutiérrez Sanín 2008; Weinstein 2006). 
Although scholars often assume criminal groups are fundamentally profit-maximizers 
(e.g. Skaperdas and Syropoulos 1997), smaller gangs are often held together primarily 
by culture and identity (e.g. Hagedorn 1994). The PCC’s approach to governance 
depends on factors that are similarly non-materialistic, but centered on universal norms 
and objectives—a kind of criminal ideology—rather than specific, local identities.  
Yet prison gangs, the PCC included, are not engaged in competitive state-
building, and the PCC’s ideology, unlike those typical of insurgencies, does not promise 
a utopian future after victory. Indeed, its lofty mission of “peace among thieves and war 
on the state” translates into relatively mundane practical demands when members 
interact with officials: the “dignified serving of one’s time” (Biondi 2016, 63) and 
observance of the rights guaranteed by Brazil’s own penal code. These are hardly 
revolutionary objectives. Indeed, they may be largely satisfied in São Paulo, where 
prison violence and unrest has become rare. And though the PCC is expansionist, it 
seeks neither revolution nor secession, but rather leeway to govern spaces and 
populations that the state seemed unable or disinclined to govern itself. To win that 
leeway in São Paulo, the PCC orchestrated debilitating terror attacks; under hegemony, 
ironically, the PCC holds its capacity for disruption in reserve, and the threat it poses to 
state authority has become oblique. 
The PCC’s uncontested rule in São Paulo and rapid expansion throughout Brazil 
suggest the comparative advantages of rational-bureaucratic legitimacy in criminal 
governance. That even upstart local factions contesting PCC expansion emulate its form 
suggests that the rise of rational-bureaucratic authority may be as irreversible in the 
criminal realm as it was in that of states and firms at the dawn of modernity. Yet the 
PCC’s colonial project has faced serious setbacks, while the CV, with its confederacy of 
autonomous franchises run by charismatic leaders, has shown signs of resilience and 
resurgence, building a system of flexible alliances with local factions rather than an 
integrated (but threatening) organizational presence. With the collapse of the PCC-CV 
non-aggression pact in 2016 and the ensuing eruption of inter-faction conflict 
throughout the country, the coming years will provide grim evidence of which approach 
is superior. Meanwhile, research on prison gangs, criminal governance, and perhaps 
armed groups in general can benefit from comparison with the PCC’s astonishing 
example.  
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